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
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NRO25X1
NRODEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 22, 1966

Dear Dick:


Enclosed is an internal memorandum to me on the subject of OXCART. It places the problem in a somewhat different context than our previous discussions. I will appreciate any personal thoughts or comments you may have on it.

Sincerely,


U. Alexis Johnson
Deputy Under Secretary

Enclosure:

1. Memo from INR to G
dated June 22, 1966.

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NRO 54103-66)
(series 6)

USAF, State Department, NRO reviews completed

The Honorable
Richard Helms,
Deputy Director, Central Intelligence.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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TO: G - Ambassador Johnson

THROUGH: INR - Mr. Hughes

FROM: INR/DDC - H. L. T. Koren *HLK*

SUBJECT: OXCART Deployment

The DCI in a memorandum of June 15 recommends deployment of OXCART commencing July 15 to be operational by mid-August; that it be committed to obtain China coverage; and that it be held in readiness for use over North Vietnam if required. This recommendation reflects his conclusion that neither satellite nor U-2 photography will provide the coverage of China required to warn of possible Chinese involvement in the Vietnam war, but that tasking of presently available assets may meet our needs for North Vietnam. This position somewhat changes the rationale for the use of OXCART. Previously, the position was that coverage of NVN targets was the most urgent requirement, and South China was secondary. If, indeed, present assets are considered capable of providing adequate coverage of key NVN targets, then the urgency to deploy OXCART is reduced. A Chicom intervention in size, having to traverse the length of NVN before contact, would surely be detected by photography of the key NVN targets.

The Joint Chiefs conclude likewise that OXCART is needed for China coverage but that presently committed assets can meet our needs in North Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs note that if a strategic build-up is detected or suspected, either a relaxation of current geographic restraints on tactical reconnaissance or a change of existing priorities could provide the desired coverage on a timely basis with present assets.

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board recommend, from a strictly intelligence standpoint, the employment of OXCART to eliminate gaps and deficiencies in existing coverage of North Vietnam and South China.

There is no doubt but that the use of OXCART after weather improves would markedly increase our coverage of key targets in both South China and North Vietnam. However, we believe that maximum use of reconnaissance

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